Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review publishes tribute to former Associate Dean David Leonard

The editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review decidated their new issue (43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 711) to David P. Leonard, former associate dean for research, professor of law and William M. Rains Fellow at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. David passed away in Feburary 2010 as a result of complications related to cancer. The issue features tributes from his colleagues and co-authors. Below is an excerpt from Dean Victor Gold's contribution to the issue.

David's essence, reflected in his writings and in his acts, was compassion. David's illness did not dull his compassion, it made that compassion stronger. In fact, his empathic understanding of the suffering of others was deepened by his own pain. He was afraid to die, but he did not withdraw into himself out of that fear. He was sad at the prospect of leaving those he loved, but he did not allow sadness to steal from him the chance to use what little time there was left to help them. And he suffered physically these last years, but through all the surgeries and treatments and side effects, he neverlost his ability to think of others.

Instead, a year into his illness he eagerly embraced a new job as Associate Dean. He relished this job because it gave him a fresh chance to help others, solve problems, and make peace. David always lived the values about which he so often wrote and taught.

Read the complete "In Memoriam" selection of tribute essays.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

What I want for Christmas is...

By Professor Katie Pratt

This op-ed was originally published in the Dec. 24, 2009 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

Nothing. Well, not exactly nothing--just nothing for me. What I really want for Christmas is for more holiday gift-givers to honor their family, friends and business contacts by making charitable contributions on their behalf instead of buying them material gifts. Members of my family recently exchanged the names of our favorite charities and agreed to make charitable contributions this year, in lieu of our usual Christmas gifts. Now I have started to think about how this could happen on a much larger scale.

Societal norms currently favor material gifts over charitable contributions to honor someone. A gift-giver often has no way of knowing whether friends, family, and business contacts would prefer a material gift or a charitable gift in their honor. Also, a gift-giver might be concerned about appearing cheap and selfish if she substitutes a tax deductible donation for a non-deductible material gift. When in doubt, gift-givers make the "safe" gift choice and give material presents. On the gift recipient's side, there typically is no easy, socially acceptable way of communicating to gift-givers a preference for a charitable contribution. This is especially true with respect to gifts for business associates, clients and professionals such as doctors.

The solution to these obstacles is an online charitable donation gift registry on which individuals and businesses could express their desire for donations to their preferred charities, in lieu of material gifts, by registering on the website. The registry would maintain a searchable list of the parties who have registered, with their preferred charities, and a list of charities, organized alphabetically by name and subject area and searchable by name or keyword. Gift-givers could search the registry to make donations honoring their friends, family, and business contacts. A fitting name for the registry would be the Gifts for Good Registry.

When I asked my colleague, tax exempt organizations expert Ellen Aprill, whether such a registry already exists, she directed me to JustGive is an online charity that maintains a searchable list of 1.5 million charities and allows a person to create a Charity Registry. The Charity Registry functions like my imagined Gifts for Good Registry, but lacks some features I envisioned, such as an e-card acknowledgement, to notify the honoree of the donation and allow for an online thank-you, and an option to

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

With prosecutions of Guantanamo terrorists, 2011 a critical year

By Professor David Glazier

As my contribution to the ""11 on '11" discussion, I would like to identify one of the most significant challenges facing the U.S. government next year as being how to prosecute Guantánamo detainees for terrorism-related offenses. The issue is particularly key right now because the House of Representatives recently voted an outright ban on the transfer of detainees from Guantánamo to the United States for any reason. A logical consequence if this measure should become law would be that it would lead to more military commission trials.

Although the government has successfully prosecuted several hundred suspected terrorists in federal courts since 9/11 while securing only five extremely problematic "convictions" at Guantánamo, there is a persistent myth that military commissions are a superior forum for trying terrorists. This has been fueled recently by media spin on the federal court trial of Ahmed Ghailani in New York. Although Ghailani was convicted of a serious offense and will probably receive a life term when he is sentenced in January, both conservative critics and mainstream news outlets have chosen to describe the outcome as a "near acquittal" rather than the substantial victory it represents, particularly given the fact that the defendant was held in CIA black sites and subject to coercive interrogation, if not outright torture.

Despite popular perceptions to the contrary, it is the military commissions which pose much greater risk of failure in terrorism trials. Their serious legal flaws provide a number of grounds on which convictions can (and objectively should) be overturned while their ad hoc proceedings with rules made up on the fly have regularly proved embarrassing to the government and threaten to compromise larger national interests. I address these issues in much more detail in a draft article entitled "Still a Bad Idea: Military Commissions Under the Obama Adminstration."

The big health care story of 2011: Will we get to keep health care reform?

By Professor Brietta Clark

Certainly the biggest health care story of 2010 was the passage of health care reform--the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "Care Act"). This reform was considered an historic feat--numerous presidents and legislators have tried and failed to overhaul the private health care system to guarantee universal access. While the Care Act likely will not achieve universal access, it is certainly the closest we've come and the most dramatic step toward this goal since creation of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in the 1960s.

So what could top that in 2011? Nothing. Health care reform will still be the No. 1 health care story of the year, except this time the question is: Will we get to keep it?

The president's signature on the Care Act was hardly dry before people began attacking the new legislation. The two most high-profile attacks are coming from Republicans in Congress, emboldened by their recent gains in the House, and constitutional challenges to the law in federal courts. While Republican threats to repeal the Care Act makes for great political theater, there is a pretty strong consensus that such a repeal would never make it to President Obama's desk. The constitutional challenges pose a more credible threat to reform because they present a novel question about the federal government's power to require citizens to purchase private goods. However, the long history of federal government regulation in the area of health care spending and insurance means that challengers will have an uphill battle in the courts as well.

A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging the reform law by states and private individuals. These suits attack the three most important parts of the Care Act that expand health care access: (1) the expansion of Medicaid to cover all adults who fall below a certain income by 2014 (existing law only mandates coverage for children, pregnant women and people with disabilities); (2) creation and regulation of state health care exchanges (the mechanism to ensure that consumers can buy insurance plans that comply with benefits, affordability, and nondiscrimination protections); and (3) the individual mandate (which requires the purchase of insurance that satisfies minimum requirements).

Tuesday, December 14, 2010

The big redistricting story of 2011: 'We, the People'

By Associate Professor Justin Levitt

For my own contribution to the "11 on '11" kickoff of the Loyola Law School blog, I'd like to focus on redistricting. Every 10 years, the electoral districts of local, state and federal representatives are redrawn to keep pace with population movement. This cycle begins again in just a few months, as the Census Bureau releases the results of the national Census. Redistricting will then flare across the national consciousness for a few short moments, leaving scholars and pundits the remainder of the decade to interpret for a confused public the import of the process for the electoral landscape. For observers of the political process, redistricting is much like the medieval reappearance of a decennial comet--only with a lot more litigation.

At least three developments merit special attention in 2011. All revolve around the role that we, the people, have in redistricting.

One: The first is our latest attempt to assert control over the process. In most jurisdictions, legislators are in charge of drawing their own district lines or the lines they hope to inhabit. Because the composition of a district can have a direct and substantial impact on an incumbent's job security, legislators are naturally tempted to pick and choose voters based on personal or partisan reward or punishment. Districts have been drawn to include prominent donors or exclude promising challengers, notably including then-state Senator Barack Obama. When practiced by insiders with a stake in the game, the process can be the most vicious of political bloodsports.

Friday, December 10, 2010

Associate Professor Aaron Caplan presents on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" at Georgetown University Law Center

Associate Professor Aaron Caplan spoke at Georgetown University Law Center on November 17, 2010 as part the conference titled "The Future of Don't Ask, Don't Tell". View the video. Caplan is co-counsel for Major Margaret Witt, an Air Force nurse who recently won reinstatement to the military after being discharged for her sexual orientation. The decision in her case established the important legal principle that the U.S. Constitution gives heightened judicial scrutiny to government actions that interfere with one's ability to form intimate relationships (including same-sex relationships). More information on the Witt litigation is available at the ACLU of Washington's website.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Election Hangover: The Real Legacy of Bush v. Gore

By Professor Rick Hasen

Professor Rick Hasen recently wrote this jurisprudence essay, which was published by Slate. It begins:

What's the central legacy of Bush v. Gore, which has its 10th anniversary next Sunday? Republicans see the Supreme Court stopping a lawless recount, while Democrats see a lawless court stopping a legitimate recount. Ten years later, commentators like Jeffrey Toobin protest that Bush v. Gore brought dishonor on the Court. But the Supreme Court's public legitimacy has not suffered.

The real lesson of the Florida fiasco (not merely Bush v. Gore) is about something else: the undermining of the public's faith in the fairness of American elections. This has triggered an ongoing war over their administration.

Full Story »

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

With reading and accessing WikiLeaks documents, some law to consider

By Professor David Glazier

There has been significant discussion over the past week about potential consequences of downloading and sharing WikiLeaks documents classified by the U.S. government, ranging from schools' cautions to their students about potential job consequences to government agencies restricting access or discussion. One thing missing from most of this discussion is the relevant law. It does not seem to be widely understood that the public exposure of these documents does NOT declassify them. WikiLeaks can disclose classified information, but it cannot declassify it. As a matter of law these documents retain the original classification assigned to them until such time as an executive branch official with legal authority to alter the classification formally does so, or until the period of time established for them to remain classified has expired. (Many classified documents will be marked with a specified duration for their classification). While it may seem like government agencies endeavoring to limit access to the WikiLeaks site or public discussion of the documents by their employees are engaging in politically motivated censorship, it is in fact consistent with their obligations to enforce the law.

The reason that the fact that these documents continue to be classified really matters is federal espionage law, particularly 18 U.S.C. sec. 793. Most subsections of that statute contain a mens rea requirement that the perpetrator intends or has reason to believe that the information they are accessing or distributing "is to be used to the injury of the United States." I would contend that a citizen accessing information online for the purpose of informing themselves about what the U.S. government has been doing does not satisfy this requirement and could not reasonably be prosecuted under those sections. It is not hard to see, however, that those responsible for leaking the information to WikiLeaks, and potentially those responsible for posting it--knowing it would almost certainly be accessed by foreign governments and groups with interests inimical to those of the U.S. might reasonably be prosecuted under these sections. But the way U.S. espionage law currently reads, any American who simply retains or forwards any of these documents could also find them self violating federal law.

The specific legal provision of most concern is subsection (e) of 18 U.S.C. sec. 793, which reads (with some omissions simply for clarity):

Monday, December 6, 2010

Perry oral argument wrap-up: All three judges interested in the narrow case of California

By Associate Professor Doug NeJaime

Associate Professor Doug NeJaime wrote about the potential implications of Perry v. Schwarzenegger in a post last week. He live-Tweeted today's oral arguments.

While the first hour of oral argument in Perry focused on the question of standing, the second hour moved on to the meat of the case: the substantive merits regarding Prop. 8 and same-sex couples' right to marry. And here all three judges seemed genuinely interested in a narrow framing of the case--as one about whether California has a legitimate interest in taking away the label "marriage" from lesbian and gay Californians while leaving intact a comprehensive domestic partnership regime that provides the rights and benefits of marriage. In other words, can the Ninth Circuit rule that Prop. 8 is unconstitutional without directly impacting marriage restrictions in other states? Indeed, even Judge Smith, the most conservative judge on the panel, pointedly asked Charles Cooper, attorney for the Prop 8 proponents, whether one can find that California lacks a rational basis for the law without also finding that other states lack a rational basis for their marriage bans.

This narrow framing does not appear to be the plaintiffs' strategy of choice. They have consistently argued that lesbians and gay men enjoy a fundamental right to marry under the federal Due Process Clause and that classifications based on sexual orientation should (like race) be subject to strict scrutiny under the federal Equal Protection Clause. Yet various amici have been pushing a more limited framing of the case. The judges appear to have taken these arguments seriously, pressing the lawyers on the complexities of the California-specific reading. Although Ted Olson, arguing for the plaintiffs, maintained his position in favor of a more sweeping ruling, he nonetheless indulged the judges' interest in the more limited reading and set out a compelling argument that Prop. 8 fails a less searching level of scrutiny. And Terry Stewart, representing the City of San Francisco, argued forcefully that the Ninth Circuit could find Prop. 8 invalid under rational basis review because it constitutes nothing more than a classification for its own sake.

The panel's intense focus on the California-specific reading of the case made Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2, especially central to the argument. And, perhaps unsurprisingly, it was Justice Kennedy who wrote for the majority in that case. The Ninth Circuit panel, or at least Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins, may be preparing to craft a decision favorable to same-sex couples that relies explicitly on Justice Kennedy's earlier reasoning. This would deliver the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court in a way that allows Justice Kennedy to continue where he left off in Romer.

If this less sweeping, more California-centric understanding of the case prevails at the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court would be directly presented with a way to rule in favor of lesbian and gay equality while leaving intact the discriminatory laws of the majority of states. The bigger question of a nationwide right to marry for same-sex couples would continue to wait for its day in court.

Do states have human rights?

By Professor Cesare Romano

This is Professor Cesare Romano's second dispatch from the Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol in Cancun. Romano reported from the conference last week.

Something that happened in Cancun, at the Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Convention and Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP), made me wonder whether and to what extent states enjoy the same human rights individuals do.

To cut a rather long story short, virtually all major modern multilateral environmental treaties are endowed with a body and a procedure to ensure states' compliance with their obligations under the agreement. These are the so-called "non-compliance procedures."

The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol have a non-compliance body, made of independent experts, and a procedure to handle cases of non-compliance. Recently, Croatia was found in violation of certain of its obligations by the Compliance Committee's Enforcement Branch. In Cancun, Croatia raised a very interesting question. Namely, it argued that it had a right to appeal the Enforcement Branch's report, asking the matter to be referred to the plenary COP/MOP.

Thursday, December 2, 2010

Marriage equality's road to the Court

By Associate Professor Doug NeJaime

This is the third installment in the 11-part series, "11 on '11," in which Loyola Law School professors are weighing in on what they expect to be the biggest legal issues in their fields in 2011. (On Monday, Dec. 6, Professor NeJaime will live Tweet the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals oral arguments in Perry v. Schwarzenegger beginning at 10 a.m. PT. He will provide follow-up analysis on Summary Judgments afterward.)

Everyone now seems to agree: The U.S. Supreme Court will eventually take up the issue of marriage for same-sex couples. But an open question remains: in what context?

Two potentially landmark federal cases are working their way through the courts. The first, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, is a carefully constructed piece of movement advocacy. LGBT rights lawyers have long avoided the issue of marriage in the federal courts, preferring instead to work with sympathetic state courts (and, increasingly, legislatures) and keep the issue away from a generally conservative U.S. Supreme Court. But after a series of state-level victories, lawyers at Boston-based Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed their Gill complaint, which challenges the unequal treatment of Massachusetts married couples (same-sex vs. different-sex) under the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA prohibits the federal government from recognizing same-sex "spouses," thereby creating two separate systems of federal treatment of couples who are married for Massachusetts state law purposes.

Meanwhile, in the wake of Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to prohibit marriage for same-sex couples, the newly formed American Foundation for Equality Rights (AFER) filed Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a federal constitutional challenge to the ban. While LGBT rights lawyers refused to challenge Proposition 8 in federal court and discouraged AFER from doing so--preferring instead to work at the state level--famed litigators Ted Olson and David Boies took the case.

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

Ninth Circuit overturns murder conviction based on perjured informant testimony

By Professor Alexandra Natapoff

Yesterday, in Maxwell v. Roe, the Ninth Circuit decided that Bobby Joe Maxwell's due process rights were violated in 1984 when the government used Sidney "the Snitch Professor" Storch as the main witness at his multiple homicide trial. L.A. Times story here: Appeals Court overturns murder convictions of alleged L.A. serial killer.

This is an important case for a number of reasons. The first is historical: Storch was one of the most infamous jailhouse snitches in the Los Angeles County Jail during the 1980s, a period in which jailhouse snitch fabrication was rampant, numerous wrongful convictions occurred, and which eventually triggered a massive Grand Jury investigation and strigent reforms in Los Angeles.

The factual basis for the decision is also important. Appellate courts rarely conclude as a factual matter that a witness such as a jailhouse informant committed perjury, which is one of the reasons it is so difficult to overturn a conviction even after a witness recants. See previous post: In the news-- Recantation. In this case, the Ninth Circuit decided that "it was objectively unreasonable for the Superior Court to find that Storch testified truthfully at the 1984 trial," based on Storch's history as an informant and his other lies at trial.

Read the complete posting.

To suppress or not to suppress? Fourth Amendment takes center stage

By Professor Laurie Levenson

All of the cases before the U.S. Supreme Court are important, but for the 2010-2011 term, some criminal procedure cases are more important than others. The Fourth Amendment is the meat and potatoes for most criminal practitioners. This term presents two important cases regarding the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations.

The case of Davis v. United States, No. 09-11328, while addressing changes in the rules for searches incident to an arrest in an automobile, really focuses on where the Court may be headed with the exclusionary rule. Ever since Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009), many have speculated about whether the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would expand to swallow the rule itself. Slowly but surely, the courts have created more good faith exceptions to the rule. The latest expansion of the good faith exception may come in Davis, where the United States argues that searches conducted before the Court's new ruling in Arizona v. Gant, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), should not be suppressed because law enforcement was relying on prior Supreme Court precedent. (Supreme Court opinions are available online.)

Yet, while this is undoubtedly an important issue, there is more to watch in this case. In footnote 33 of the amicus brief recently filed by Wayne County, Mich., law enforcement is once again pushing to reduce all exclusionary rule decisions to a question of whether law enforcement's conduct was "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent." Law enforcement has not been shy in suggesting that the Court push this agenda. As they put it, "there is no time like the present." Davis could end up being a blockbuster case, depending upon how narrowly or broadly the Court applies the exclusionary rule. The Court may continue to chip away at the exclusionary rule, or bust it wide open once and for all, and let individual judges in each case balance whether the law enforcement officers in question could and needed to be deterred.

But, that is not all. The Supreme Court has yet another case waiting in the wings, Tolentino v. New York, No. 09-11556, that will examine the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine under the exclusionary rule. Jose Tolentino was unlawfully stopped for playing music too loudly. Police learned his name, ran a DMV check, and discovered that his license had been suspended. He was then arrested for driving without a license. The New York court refused to suppress the evidence because it held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a person's identity. The majority rejected the dissent's argument that refusing to apply the exclusionary rule will "give law enforcement an incentive to illegally stop, detain, and search anyone for the sole purpose of discovering the person's identity and determining if it matches any government records."

There is a good chance this term that the Court will reshape the Fourth Amendment by expanding the good-faith exception and contracting the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine. At least for drivers confronted by law enforcement, the protections of the Fourth Amendment may soon be getting thinner and thinner.

Climate change conference: Will Cancun deliver?

By Professor Cesare Romano

Once a year the world gathers to discuss what we should do to stop catastrophic climate change, or, more realistically, how we can give ourselves enough time to adjust to its inevitable effects. This past weekend an estimated 15,000 people, representing 194 states, NGOs and media converged on Cancun, Mexico, for the annual ritual of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

The last conference of this size produced as much emissions as a 150,000-person Northern European town. However organizers claim as much as possible is being done to keep emissions down--including using solar and wind to generate electricity, reducing water use in hotels and providing hybrid cars for transport. We are all encouraged to calculate our carbon emissions at computers provided at the conference and offset the impact by supporting local projects. The Mexican Government will plant around 10,000 trees and bushes around Cancun. The dress code, usually very formal, has been relaxed. We have all been encouraged by the president of the conference to buy and wear a guayabera, the Mexican male holiday shirt, in lieu of wearing a tie and jacket.

The last meeting of the COP (Copenhagen, December 2010) created very high expectations but failed to deliver. The meeting was emphatically billed as "the last chance to save the planet," and world leaders including President Barack Obama turned up. However, nations, and in particular the two key players, the U.S. and China, failed to agree on a legally binding target to cut emissions. Instead, a weak 'Copenhagen Accord' was signed that allows countries to choose their own targets but has no power to force them to keep the promises.

Will Cancun be different? In comparison to Copenhagen, this meeting has been massively down played. World leaders are not even turning up this time, leaving it to their environment and foreign ministers. It is generally agreed that a global deal to cut emissions is unlikely, now and ever. However, supporters of the process, particularly environmental NGOs, are hopeful that the talks could make progress towards a deal by putting in place the 'functioning architecture'. Don't hold your breath because they have been trying to do that since Berlin in 1995, when truly yours was a young legal intern at the Convention's secretariat.

At a minimum, this time I will have a Guayabera to take home. Stay tuned for more reports from the water-filled trenches of climate change!

This is the first in a series of reports Professor Cesare Romano will file from the Cancun conference.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

Introducing Summary Judgments

Welcome to Summary Judgments, the new Loyola Law School, Los Angeles faculty blog. Intended to be read by lawyers, judges, scholars and students, this blog will offer commentary on legal and policy issues as well as highlight the academic pursuits of the Loyola community.

This forum will feature professors' analyses of legal matters ripped from the headlines. That will be complemented by periodic digests of faculty members' scholarly work and prolific media commentary. From time to time, we'll post summaries of the many academic events Loyola hosts on campus, from law review symposia to policy colloquia. Most importantly, this blog will serve as a clearinghouse for the wide variety of viewpoints here at Loyola Law School.

We will debut this blog with the "11 on '11" series. Eleven members of the Loyola faculty will offer commentary on what they expect to be the most significant legal developments in their respective fields in 2011. My colleague and blogger extraordinaire Rick Hasen will open the series by commenting on McComish v. Bennett, a case challenging the matching funds provision of Arizona's public financing law.

Thanks for joining us. We hope you return often!

-Professor Michael Waterstone, Associate Dean for Research and Academic Centers

The Big Campaign Finance Story of 2011: An Effective End to Public Financing

By Professor Rick Hasen

It is with great pleasure that I kick off the "11 on '11" series at Summary Judgments, the new Loyola Law School, Los Angeles faculty blog. The series asks us to identify what is likely to be the most significant legal development in our field in 2011. In the field of campaign finance, the big story is likely to be the continued demise in public financing of campaigns, a development caused by both court rulings and legislative inertia.

As early as tomorrow morning, I expect the United States Supreme Court to agree to hear McComish v. Bennett, a case challenging the matching funds provision of Arizona's public financing law. Under the law, a candidate for state office who agrees to take public financing in lieu of private funds to finance a campaign receives extra public financing when the candidate faces a wealthy opponent who spends large sums in the election or by large independent expenditures against the candidate accepting public financing. As I explained in a June post at the Election Law Blog, I expect the Court to not only take this case, but to reverse the Ninth Circuit and strike down the Arizona public financing system. (To be clear, that's not a result I favor: the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the case, and Judge Kleinfeld's concurrence, offer strong reasons to reach a contrary decision in this case and uphold the Arizona regime).

This development is significant because the Court is likely to take away one of the only tools available to drafters of public financing measures to make such financing attractive to candidates. Public financing has a number of benefits, including reducing the threat of corruption and the appearance of corruption, providing a jump start for new candidates who are not professional politicians, and freeing up candidates and officeholders to have more time to interact with voters. But rational politicians who are serious candidates will not opt into the public financing plan unless they think they will be able to run a competitive campaign under the public financing system. The whole point of the extra matching funds in the Arizona plan is to give candidates assurance they won't be vastly outspent in their election. While an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court in McComish would not mean that all public financing systems would be unconstitutional, it would eliminate one of the best ways to create effective public financing systems.

If the Court strikes down the Arizona plan, I expect reformers will push for various alternative plans (which have been proposed over the last few years) to provide public financing to candidates, along with a multiplier match (3 or 4:1) for small contributions. (Give a candidate $100? The candidate gets an additional $300 or $400 from the public financing system.) The idea here would be to provide another way that publicly financed candidates to run competitive campaigns without running afoul of the First Amendment (as likely understood by the Court in McComish). Such plans,however, face two major problems. First, it is not clear if they will actually attract such candidates to participate. Will a rational candidate expect that there will be enough money in the system from these multiplier matches to participate, when facing not only wealthy candidates, but independent spending campaigns which can now be funded by unlimited corporate or union funds through super-PACS? (All of this new funding, of course, is thanks to the big campaign finance story of 2010, the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United.)

Second, it will be a hard sell to enact new public finance laws during these difficult economic times. Arizona passed its current measure via initiative. It would require considerable work and resources to get a new measure before voters and passed.

The lack of public financing will also be a major story in the upcoming 2012 presidential campaign, which will get going in 2011. As I describe in detail in Richard L. Hasen, The Transformation of the Campaign Financing Regime for U.S. Presidential Elections, in THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES (Keith Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom, and Joo-Cheong Tham, eds., Routledge, forthcoming March 2011) (draft available), no serious candidate in the 2012 presidential campaign will be able to afford to take public financing: the U.S. system for publicly financing presidential elections simply has not kept up with the ability of non-participating candidates to raise funds privately. Though President Obama pledged to fix the public financing system, he's never come forward with a plan to do so, and even if he did, such a plan would have virtually no chance getting out of the Republican House or past a Senate filibuster.

Public financing will still exist in 2011 and beyond, but expect fewer participants and less of an impact of such systems going forward.

Monday, November 8, 2010

States cannot ignore federal role in Medicaid administration

By Professor Brietta Clark

For the past few years, the California legislature has been trying to deal with its fiscal crisis by cutting Medi-Cal spending dramatically. Medi-Cal is California's version of Medicaid -- it is a joint federal-state program that benefits significantly from federal funding, and is also subject to federal law. Health care providers and beneficiaries have used federal law to challenge recent state cuts in federal courts, pretty successfully so far.

The latest round in this battle between providers and the state occurred a few weeks ago, in California Association of Rural Health Clinics v. Maxwell-Jolly (CARHC). CARHC challenged a law enacted last year that eliminated coverage for certain services, including adult dental, podiatry and chiropractic serivces, provided by Rural Health Centers (RHCs) and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. RHCs and FQHCs are located in medically underserved areas, and they are required to treat people without regard to their ability to pay.

Read more at Prof. Clark's Health Care Justice Blog.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Supreme Court takes on violence in videogames

By Professor F. Jay Dougherty

The Supreme Court heard oral argument today in the case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n. This case is a facial challenge to California's recent attempt to regulate minors' access to certain "violent videogames". In U.S. law, certain sexual material--obscenity--is excluded from other "speech" protected from government regulation by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has, however, permitted laws that limit a minor's access to certain sexual material that would not be "obscene" as to an adult, and that don't unduly restrict an adult's access to such material. But historically, violent material has been viewed as fully protected speech, and "obscenity" has been carefully limited to sexual material. The rare instances where violent speech can be unlawful involve speech that is intended to and likely to cause imminent unlawful behavior. That rationale is not the core justification for the California statute in this case. Rather, the argument is that violent material will cause psychological harm to minors. Hence, in this case, California asked the Court to treat violence for the first time much like obscenity--permit states to limit minors' access to material, even if that material would clearly be protected unregulable speech as to an adult.

The lower courts have refused to do that in this case (and in other cases challenging similar laws in other states). The Ninth Circuit refused to extend to violent videogames the rules applicable to obscenity regulation, and, applying the "strict scrutiny" required as to content-based regulations of speech (which the state law would be), found that scrutiny not satisfied. First, there was no credible evidence that violent media causes psychological harm to anyone, including children. Since protecting against such harm was the only "compelling government interest" the state could assert, the law failed strict scrutiny. Even if one assumed the state did prove such a compelling interest, the statute failed the second part of the strict scrutiny test; namely that the law be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate that interest and there are no less restrictive alternatives. The current industry rating system, the availability of parental controls on modern gaming systems, and enhancing education of parents and retailers about that system would achieve the goal in a less restrictive manner, according to the Ninth Circuit.

Monday, November 1, 2010

Prof. John Nockleby awarded rank of Honorary Diplomate by ABOTA

Professor John Nockleby, director of Loyola's Civil Justice Program and founder of its Journalist Law School, was awarded the rank of Honorary Diplomate by the American Board of Trial Advocates.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Evil Men in Black Robes: Slate's judicial election campaign ad spooktacular!

By Professor Rick Hasen

If you're a fan of The Exorcist and Carrie, if you like sex and violence and ominous music, you've come to the right place. Because we have gathered some of the most spine-chilling Halloween footage you will ever see--all produced in an effort to influence state judicial elections.

Thirty-eight states hold some form of election for their state supreme court justices, and the elections are getting ever nastier and more expensive. Whereas the spending on these races was once infinitesimal and the advertising--to the extent it existed--minimal and usually mild, that's all changing. The reasons are complicated. Judges have been targets in the culture wars, and their elections have attracted the attention of a polarized electorate. But the money behind the campaigns often comes from business, trial lawyers, and labor interests, whose bottom lines are routinely affected by state court rulings.

Read the full piece, "Evil Men in Black Robes: Slate's judicial eleciton campaign ad spooktacular!" here.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Cornell Law Review to publish Prof. Lee Petherbridge's recent article on judicial impact of scholarship

Associate Professor Lee Petherbridge has just accepted an offer to publish his article The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study in the Cornell Law Review.


Chief Justice Roberts recently explained that he does not pay much attention to law review articles, reportedly stating that they are not "particularly helpful for practitioners and judges." Chief Justice Roberts's criticism echoes that made by other judges, some of whom, like Judge Harry Edwards, have been much more strident in the contention that legal scholarship is largely unhelpful to practitioners and judges. Perhaps inspired by criticisms like those leveled by Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Edwards, legal scholars have sought to investigate the relevance of legal scholarship to courts and practitioners using a variety of means. One avenue of investigation has been empirical, where several studies, using different, and sometimes ambiguous, methodologies have observed a decrease in citation to legal scholarship and interpreted the observation to mean that legal scholarship has lost relevance to courts and practitioners.

The study reported here examines the hypothesis that legal scholarship has lost relevance to courts. Using empirical techniques and an original dataset that is substantially more comprehensive than those used in previous studies, it examines citation to legal scholarship by the United States circuit courts of appeals over the last 59 years. It finds a rather surprising result. Contrary to the claims of Justice Roberts and Judge Edwards, and contrary to the results of prior studies, this study finds that over the last 59 years - and particularly over the last 20 years - there has been a marked increase in the frequency of citation to legal scholarship in the reported opinions of the circuit courts of appeals. Using empirical and theoretical methods, this study also considers explanations for courts' increased use of legal scholarship.

Prof. Kathleen Kim's dual impact on human trafficking

In Yusaf v. Tija, the California Court of Appeal upheld a lower court judgment holding an employer liable for violating the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act (a civil provision). Associate Professor Kathleen Kim authored this statutory provision. She also provided technical support to the plaintiffs in Yusaf and co-authored this amicus brief in the case.

Following is the summary of the argument in the amicus brief:

In 2000, the federal government passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"). TVPA §102(a), 22 U.S.C. §7101(a) (2000). The TVPA, as amended, was designed to eradicate human trafficking through the implementation of a three-part strategy involving (1) benefits and services to victims; (2) punishment of offenders; and (3) establishment of a mechanism to monitor and eliminate trafficking worldwide. Congress knew at the time it drafted the TVPA that in order to succeed in its goal of eradicating human trafficking the federal government needed to enlist the participation of both domestic state, and international, governments.

As a result, and at the encouragement of the federal government, several states adopted their own anti-trafficking laws. Five years after the passage of the TVPA, on September 21, 2005, the California state legislature adopted the California Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("CA-TVPA") which was modeled after the federal TVPA. Cal. Penal Code §236.1 (West 2005). The issue of preemption raised by the appellant is an unusual theory given the backdrop against which the TVPA was enacted. Is the TVPA meant to preempt the very state anti-trafficking laws it encouraged the creation of? Given the legislative intent, and consistent language of the two statutes, it is clear that the TVPA does not preempt California's anti-trafficking laws. The 2008 amendment to the TVPA explicitly states that the TVPA shall not preempt any state criminal laws. TVPA §225, 22 U.S.C. §7101 (2008). There is no clearer indication of congressional intent than the express language of the statute which prohibits preemptions of the CA-TVPA. Furthermore, preemption of the CA-TVPA would be inconsistent with the federal government's implementation of the federal TVPA. Ever since the passage of the TVPA in 2000 the federal government has encouraged state legislators to adopt their own anti-trafficking laws. For example, the Department of Justice set forth a model state anti-trafficking statute to encourage states to enact state level anti-trafficking laws. If Congress intended to preempt state anti-trafficking laws, the federal government would have more explicitly promoted one uniform legal standard that could be applied across the board. Instead, the federal government has done the opposite. It has encouraged states to craft state level anti-trafficking laws with the flexibility to accommodate the unique qualities of existing laws in those respective states.

In addition, California adopted the CA-TVPA with the federal TVPA in mind. The CA-TVPA is consistent with the federal TVPA and even incorporates the TVPA by reference.

Finally, non-physical psychological coercion as a means of forcing labor is explicitly prohibited by the federal TVPA and therefore does not preempt the CA-TVPA's similar prohibition of psychological coercion. Based on the foregoing, preemption of the CA-TVPA would be wholly inconsistent with the explicit intent of Congress and the conduct of the Department of Justice, the federal agency charged with overseeing the implementation of the federal TVPA.

Friday, October 15, 2010

Assoc. Prof. Justin Levitt featured in Gerrymandering

Associate Professor Justin Levitt is featured prominently in the new movie Gerrymandering, starting its run this Friday at the Nuart Theater. I'm including some information on the film below, and you can find details about the theater here.

Thursday, October 14, 2010

Assoc. Prof. Horton writes amicus brief in AT&T case

Associate Professor David Horton wrote and filed an amicus brief in the AT&T Mobility LLC v. Vincent and Liza Concepcion case scheduled for oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court on Nov. 9.

Excerpt of the summary:

This is a case about what the unconscionability doctrine is, not what ATTM and its amici want it to be. "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

City of Bell's problems highlight problems defining disability

By Professor Michael Waterstone

Recently, there was a new twist in the sad saga of the city of Bell. At the same time he was being hired as Bell's police chief, Randy Adams agreed with Bell city officials that he was disabled. He claims he has knee, back and neck problems and was deserving of a medical pension; skeptics suggest this was a fraudulent move to shield retirement benefits from taxes.

As the case goes forward, we will likely figure out where the truth lies. But this story raises a larger issue. In our legal system, we have conflicting definitions and understandings of disability.

On one hand, disability is viewed as a medical issue. An individual is evaluated by a doctor who determines how severe his impairments may be. If the cumulative impacts of that person's impairments reach a certain level - typically, whether or not the person can work - they are considered "disabled." This label provides the gateway to different types of government benefits and services.

This medical-based view of disability had its roots in the Civil War veterans' pension system. Veterans who were completely unable to work got $8 a month; those who were missing a finger got $2 a month. This basic framework is still in effect in various types of government social benefit programs, including Social Security Disability benefits, access to state Medicare programs, and the current Veterans Administration. In all these cases, a doctor's evaluation as to how "disabled" a person is determines whether or not they get benefits.

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Massachusetts Supreme Court disapproves of prosecutorial rewards to witnesses

By Professor Alexandra Natapoff

Two witnesses in Wayne Miranda's murder trial received $2000 each from the Chamber of Commerce because their testimony assisted in producing a guilty verdict. As the Boston Globe writes, the Massachusettes Supreme Court, while approving such witness reward programs generally, has ruled that prosecutors cannot participate in themor help witnesses get rewards when those rewards are contingent on convictions. Commonwealth v. Wayne Miranda, SJC-10568.

Two witnesses in Wayne Miranda's murder trial received $2000 each from the Chamber of Commerce because their testimony assisted in producing a guilty verdict. As the Boston Globe writes, the Massachusettes Supreme Court, while approving such witness reward programs generally, has ruled that prosecutors cannot participate in themor help witnesses get rewards when those rewards are contingent on convictions. Commonwealth v. Wayne Miranda, SJC-10568.

While the Massachusetts Supreme Court should be lauded for its ethical concern, its decision is somewhat ironic. Prosecutors routinely provide far greater benefits to criminal informant witnesses, in the form of liberty and leniency, than a few thousand dollars. In many jurisdictions, these rewards can be contigent on conviction. And even when the rewards are not expressly contingent on conviction, every attorney and informant knows that a witness in a successful conviction is more likely to get rewarded.

This is why Professor George Harris [author of Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (2000)], and I have recommended leveling the playing field by creating defense informants, i.e. rewards for informants who come forward with information that might help the defense rather than the prosecution. As it currently stands, an offender with information helpful to the defense cannot expect any benefits--only the government can give those. This lopsided arrangement is, as the Massachusetts Supreme Court pointed out, not in the interests of accuracy or justice.

For more postings, please see Prof. Natapoff's Snitching blog at

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

Prof. Georgene Vairo discusses environmental torts at RAND

Professor Georgene Vairo gave a presentation at RAND in their policy series on "The Long Tail of Environmental Liability Litigation," discussing the the Chevron/Ecuador litigation and the BP litigation stemming from the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

Wednesday, September 8, 2010

Prof. Maureen Pacheco published 'The Defense of Children'

Clinical Professor Maureen Pacheco, clinical director of the Center for Juvenile Law & Policy, published "The Defense of Children - A Call to Arms" in the The Champion, the magazine of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Read the complete piece at: