Loyola Professors Release Journalist's Guide to American Law

Reporting on the legal system without a law degree can be challenging. A team of Loyola Law School professors aimed to fix that by writing The Journalist's Guide to American Law. The book, published by Routledge and released on Monday, Dec. 10, serves as an essential reference for journalists whose coverage area includes the law. The authors are Professors John Nockleby, Laurie Levenson, Karl Manheim, Jay Dougherty, Dean Victor Gold, Allan Ides and Daniel Martin.

From the publisher:

> How do you report on the latest sensational criminal trial or newest controversial legislation without a basic understanding of how the American legal system works?

> This easy-to-use guidebook offers an overview of American law that should be found on the desk of any journalism student or professional journalist. It provides an overview of major legal principles and issues in simple terms for journalists who cover any aspect of the legal system. The Guide can be used in two ways: first, as a sit-down read that gives an overview of American law; and second, as a reference that can be used every day under deadline pressure for a specific purpose. Every feature of the book is designed to serve both functions. Thus, the book's organization captures both the birds-eye view of a subject; and, alternatively, permits a quick review of a given section when the professional needs to understand a distinct concept. The areas covered range from professional concerns such as the First Amendment, cameras in the courtroom, Sunshine laws, and access to government documents to general legal matters such as the institutions of law and lawmaking function of the judiciary; core constitutional principles such as separation of powers and judicial review; and how courts function.

> The book is ideal for use in general newswriting and reporting courses, particularly those with a focus on legal or court reporting, and may also be used as a supplementary text in Media Law courses.

Supreme Court limits First Amendment scrutiny of copyright laws in Golan v. Holder opinion

By Professor Jay Dougherty

On Jan. 18, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated decision in a case challenging the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. §104A, which restored copyright to millions of foreign works and granted federal copyright to pre-1972 foreign sound recordings. As the Court did previously in Eldred v. Ashcroft, upholding the constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act that extended all existing copyrights for 20 years, it exhibited great deference to legislative decisions as to the extent of copyright, notwithstanding the constitutional language that appears to limit legislative power to grant copyrights in order to "promote the progress" of knowledge and only for limited times. The plaintiffs, orchestra leaders and others who had relied on the public domain status of various foreign works argued that, unlike the CTEA, the restoration statute removed works from the public domain. The Court rejected their arguments. According to the majority, Congress can accord copyright protection in circumstances that do not elicit the production of new works of authorship--it is the system of protection generally that must promote progress. The government argued here that it benefits U.S. authors for the U.S. to more rigorously comply with its copyright treaty obligations, even if the new law did not elicit creation of new works (or accord any protection to U.S. works). Because the restored foreign copyrights would not last any longer than they would have, had they not entered the public domain in the first place, the statue did not violate the constitutional limited times restriction any more than the CTEA did.

Perhaps more significantly, the Court clarified the class of copyright legislation that would alter the traditional contours of copyright and thus be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Clearly, copyright laws "abridge speech," in a sense. In Eldred, the Court had rejected a First Amendment challenge except in cases where legislation alters the traditional contours of copyright. This was because copyright law contains its own internal protections of free speech interests, namely the exclusion of copyright protection for ideas and the fair use defense that permits the use of another's copyrighted expression in some situations, e.g. for purposes of commentary or parody. A panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals earlier in the development of this case had interpreted the USSC's language such that a law that removed works from the public domain would also alter the traditional contours of copyright. After all, the traditional contour of copyright protection is that works receive protection until they enter the public domain, but can thereafter be freely used by anyone. In the new decision, the Court clarified that only legislation that impacted the denial of copyright for ideas or limited fair use would alter traditional contours and require stricter First Amendment scrutiny.

[Read a longer piece of commentary on the history of the case and the oral argument before the Supreme Court last fall.]

Justices Breyer and Alito dissented. Essentially, they argued that copyright laws must be justified by a utilitarian rationale as they have historically. Also that they elicit creation of new works for the ultimate benefit of society. Removing existing works from the public domain does not elicit any new creation, and also impacts free speech interests of the public. Hence, they argued, such a law should be scrutinized to see that it served some important copyright-related purpose. Even if solidifying the U.S. position in the international copyright system is important, the treaties actually permit less restrictive alternatives than the approach chosen by the legislature. Encouraging dissemination of works (rather than creation of new works), which the majority argued would promote knowledge, could be argued to authorize Congress to remove the Bible from the public domain, according to the dissenters. They concluded that the restoration statute exceeded Congress' power under the Constitution.

U.S.S.C Hears Oral Argument in Golan v. Holder

By Professor Jay Dougherty

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

Recent extensions of copyright have generated much controversy. Some of these controversies have led to important judicial decisions (on the Supreme Court level) concerning Congress' power to legislate in the copyright arena and the interplay between copyright laws and freedom of speech and expression. Most challenges have failed, with the courts signaling a judicial deference to Congress. In the most recent battle, Golan v. Holder, plaintiffs who have relied on the public domain status of certain foreign works challenged a law that restored copyright to those works. Assertions that the restoration exceeded Congressional power were fairly routinely rejected at the lower court levels after the U.S.S.C.'s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (affirming the 1998 Term Extension Act), but a claim that restoration violated the First Amendment seemed to have some traction. The Supreme Court accepted cert in Golan, and recently heard oral argument. In Eldred, the Court had said that a law that altered the traditional contours of copyright law would be subject to First Amendment scrutiny, and one 10th Circuit panel in Golan had held that the restoration statute would be subject to such scrutiny. The district court on remand held that the restoration statute failed First Amendment scrutiny, but that decision was reversed by another 10th Circuit panel. One might have expected the oral argument to focus on related unsettled issues, such as the level of scrutiny and requirements for its satisfaction, which would have added clarity and certainty in future disputes regarding the relationship between copyright laws and the First Amendment. Unfortunately, in this author's view, the plaintiffs spent most of the oral argument beating the dead horse of Congress' copyright legislative power and missed an opportunity to persuade the Court on appropriate First Amendment scrutiny. That might have led the Court to find that the restoration statute did not satisfy scrutiny, for example, and that there should have been more protection for reliance parties who had developed businesses utilizing public domain foreign works. It is of course still possible that the Court in its decision will address those issues. The decision, which will determine the U.S. copyright status of thousands of foreign works, will presumably be issued sometime in 2012. Below is a more detailed review of the case and the U.S.S.C. oral argument.

On October 5, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the most recent case challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the Copyright Act added in 1994 by the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act (URAA) that restored copyright to certain foreign works that had lost their U.S. copyright through a failure to comply with formalities. That section, §104A, also granted federal copyright to certain foreign sound recordings first fixed before Feb. 15, 1972, and provided for copyright in certain foreign works whose origin is a foreign country whose works are not subject to U.S. copyright, when the U.S. enters into copyright relations with that country.

Claim by Tolkien estate vs. fictional work including J.R.R. Tolkien as a character: The work of Sauron?

By Professor Jay Dougherty

Recently there have been reports that the Tolkien estate has fired off cease and desist correspondence to Steve Hillard, the Texas-residing author of a self-published book called Mirkwood. Mirkwood is apparently a fictional work, perhaps Tolkienesque, in which J.R.R. Tolkien is a character. It appears that the gist of the assertions (which are reportedly asking that the book be enjoined and destroyed) is that it is an unauthorized commercial exploitation of Tolkien's name and likeness; in other words, a violation of his rights of publicity. This claim seems extremely weak, and it's surprising that it would even be asserted.

First, the decisional law and many statutes have pretty clearly established that one doesn't have a property right in his or her life story. The same can be said as to fictional works including a "real" person as a character, at least if they are not held out as being true (and even the small line of cases drawing that line are questionable). Some plaintiffs have argued that a work that has nothing to do with the person whose persona is used becomes a "commercial exploitation" of that persona. But books, films, songs, works of art, etc. are not the same as T-shirts and coffee cups. They are works of expression--speech protected under the Constitution. (A football videogame is currently being challenged, in part on an assertion that it is just a product, not "speech." See my colleague Jennifer Rothman's recent post about oral argument in that case.) Courts in different jurisdictions have used various approaches to address tension between the relatively new right to control commercial uses of persona that are not false endorsements. Most of those approaches should favor almost any expressive use that is not an advertisement pure and simple, although one of them---the most antagonistic to freedom of expression---looks at the elusive "primary intent" of the expressive defendant. The "Mirkwood" book doesn't appear to be being held out as true, and appears to be highly expressive and "transformative" (one of the tests applied in this context). The Tolkien estate should lose on that basis.

But their claim is weak for at least two other reasons. First, many states' laws, especially covering a right of publicity after the death of the person portrayed, expressly exclude from liability speech works such as books or films. In fact, if the estate were to assert the application of Texas law to this dispute, that law has such an exclusion: "A person may use a deceased individual's name, voice, signature, or likeness in: (1) a play, book, film..." Texas Property Code Section 26.012. But the dispute may not even have to reach that clear defense. The majority rule as to whether the right of publicity survives death is to look to the law of the state of domicile at the time of death of the celebrity. Mr. Tolkien lived in England when he passed away in 1973 (long before the descendible right of publicity was officially recognized in most states). England does not recognize a right of publicity, let alone a descendible one that survives death. See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint, 292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir., 2002) (Princess Diana domiciled in England at time of death--no right of publicity claim under California deceased celebrity statute) (note that decision also affirmed a $2 million+ award of attorneys' fees to the defendant). Hence, a Texas court, if this dispute were to get that far, should toss this claim out at an early stage on a similar basis, too.

We all love Tolkien and his imaginative books. I loved the books and the films, and can't wait for the new The Hobbit films, in production now. I happily pay for them, and will continue to do so. He was a genius, and his heirs deserve to benefit from that. But he is also iconic and forever intertwined with certain types of fantasy literature. That he is now a character is such a work should be celebrated--not threatened with Sauronian attacks and destruction!

Loyola to host paparazzi law forum

By Jacqueline Lechtholz-Zey, JD '11 and Gregory Strausberg, JD '09, LLM '11

On Feb. 25, the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review will present a day-long, three panel event entitled "Paparazzi Law in a Flash: Examining California's Past, Present and Future." This symposium aims to educate its law student, media professional, and attorney audiences on the legal discourse surrounding the modern day paparazzi in the context of the recent enactment of AB 2479 ("the anti-stalking law"). This newly enacted law makes it a misdemeanor to tailgate or drive recklessly to capture a photo or tape recording of an individual for commercial purposes. It represents California's most recent attempt at addressing the storied problem of striking the proper Constitutional balance between the First Amendment's protections for newsgatherers and an individual's right to privacy. With the passage of AB 2479, it is clear that states are again starting (as they did with the rise of "yellow journalism" over a hundred years ago) to recognize a growing problem in the way this segment of the media interacts with its subjects. However, the lack of enforcement of past laws aimed at curbing abusive practices--as indicated by the relative absence of lawsuits under California Civil Code § 1708.8--demonstrates the immense power of the First Amendment and the difficulty in crafting laws that do strike this proper balance. More information about the event is available on its website.

The legal dialogue regarding the paparazzi--including its dynamic interplay of state and federal law--is a field that has intrigued scholars (legal and non-legal alike) since the beginnings of America's media and entertainment industry, as exemplified by the axiomatic writings of Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in The Right To Privacy at 4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890). While no point in American history clearly establishes the origin of an aggressive media force in need of legal regulation, many attribute the identification of this problem as coinciding with the rise of "yellow journalism" in the late nineteenth century. Such "journalism" is no better typified than by the infamous publication of an article in the New York Journal in 1898 that exclaimed, "DESTRUCTION OF THE WAR SHIP MAINE WAS THE WORK OF AN ENEMY"--a title that does not seem to sound so far flung from the typical grocery store tabloid reads of 2011. Such dramatic, seemingly simple proclamations had the power of catching the attention of the average nineteenth century reader and were therefore crucial to the fortunes of the rapidly expanding media companies of the time. However, behind such "simple" statements and their accompanying images (which often depicted famous individuals or sensationalized events) laid an extremely complex legal dilemma, which forced legal scholars such as Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren, along with the American courts, to properly consider the point at which the First Amendment shield ended and where the right to privacy sword began.

Paparazzi Law in a Flash: Examining California's Past, Present and Future will include discussions of the past, present and future legal developments on this topic in a way that is understandable to legal and non-legal professionals. Loyola Law School has assembled leading practitioners, scholars, as well as recently admitted entertainment lawyers who have all played a central role in the on-going debate of what is permissible, constitutionally protected activity versus activity giving rise to criminal and civil liability. Loyola Professor Karl Manheim will speak about parallel efforts and international privacy law. And Professor Jay Dougherty will serve as a moderator. Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review is also proud to include the discussions and articles of its own students Patrick Alach JD '09 and Gary Wax JD '09, which should be of use to those who seek to enforce or defend against the instantiation of this new statutory scheme.

This event is open to all who wish to attend. For media relations, please contact Brian Costello, deputy director of commujnications. We thank you for your support of this event and other future Loyola Law School entertainment and media law productions.

Supreme Court takes on violence in videogames

By Professor F. Jay Dougherty

The Supreme Court heard oral argument today in the case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n. This case is a facial challenge to California's recent attempt to regulate minors' access to certain "violent videogames". In U.S. law, certain sexual material--obscenity--is excluded from other "speech" protected from government regulation by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has, however, permitted laws that limit a minor's access to certain sexual material that would not be "obscene" as to an adult, and that don't unduly restrict an adult's access to such material. But historically, violent material has been viewed as fully protected speech, and "obscenity" has been carefully limited to sexual material. The rare instances where violent speech can be unlawful involve speech that is intended to and likely to cause imminent unlawful behavior. That rationale is not the core justification for the California statute in this case. Rather, the argument is that violent material will cause psychological harm to minors. Hence, in this case, California asked the Court to treat violence for the first time much like obscenity--permit states to limit minors' access to material, even if that material would clearly be protected unregulable speech as to an adult.

The lower courts have refused to do that in this case (and in other cases challenging similar laws in other states). The Ninth Circuit refused to extend to violent videogames the rules applicable to obscenity regulation, and, applying the "strict scrutiny" required as to content-based regulations of speech (which the state law would be), found that scrutiny not satisfied. First, there was no credible evidence that violent media causes psychological harm to anyone, including children. Since protecting against such harm was the only "compelling government interest" the state could assert, the law failed strict scrutiny. Even if one assumed the state did prove such a compelling interest, the statute failed the second part of the strict scrutiny test; namely that the law be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate that interest and there are no less restrictive alternatives. The current industry rating system, the availability of parental controls on modern gaming systems, and enhancing education of parents and retailers about that system would achieve the goal in a less restrictive manner, according to the Ninth Circuit.