Monday, February 25, 2013

Campaign Finance's Not-So-Final Exam

By Associate Professor Justin Levitt

This op-ed originally appeared on Jurist

For better or worse, a professor's thoughts are never far from final exams. The best exams, I think, test students' understanding not just of the governing rules, but the legal rationales that drive them. And it's no secret that in devising hypothetical questions for exams, professors often turn to potential scenarios that they've otherwise been mulling: scenarios that present tricky issues forcing the better students to dig beneath the surface. Often, these exam issues are drawn from pending or recent cases.

For better or worse, a professor's thoughts are never far from final exams. The best exams, I think, test students' understanding not just of the governing rules, but the legal rationales that drive them. And it's no secret that in devising hypothetical questions for exams, professors often turn to potential scenarios that they've otherwise been mulling: scenarios that present tricky issues forcing the better students to dig beneath the surface. Often, these exam issues are drawn from pending or recent cases.

And sometimes, the cases -- like the Supreme Court's decision last week to hear McCutcheon v. FEC -- are drawn from the exams.

In May 2011, I asked the following question on my election law exam:

Federal law imposes aggregate limits on individual campaign contributions over a two-year period. Individuals may not contribute more than $46,200 (total) to federal candidates, with no more than $2,500 to any single candidate. (These limits pertain to contributions to federal candidates only, and do not include separate limits on the aggregate amounts that individuals may give to PACs and political parties.)

Clark Tuckerberg is a social media entrepreneur and multi-billionaire. He has "friended" more than 200 members of Congress and more than 30 US Senators on Facebook -- and he would like to demonstrate that, to him, "friending" is a real commitment. He acknowledges that he may not give more than $2,500 to any single candidate. However, he would like to give $2,500 to each of the candidates that he has "friended," which would put him well over the aggregate limit.

Concepcion v. AT&T propagates law giving big business license to steal from consumers

By Brian S. Kabateck '89, Guest Alumni Blogger

Concepcion v. AT&T, 131 S.Ct. 1750 (2011) is arguably the worst consumer Supreme Court decision in the last 20 years. Interestingly, there hasn't yet been a public outcry. In this horrible decision, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act trumps all other laws. If you don't know the case and have been living in a bubble for the last two years, the facts are simple: The Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility claiming that their cell-phone company had engaged in deceptive advertising by falsely claiming that their plan included free cell phones. Their suit became a class action. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California refused to dismiss the suit despite the fact that the contract mandated binding arbitration and prohibited class action lawsuits. The district court ruled that California law prohibits consumer adhesion contracts that waive the customer's right to a jury trial, mandate arbitration and purport to waive the right to participate in a class action lawsuit. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (a law that was written before the Great Depression) mandated that any arbitration agreement was absolutely enforceable, even if it appears in a contract of adhesion.

Before Concepcion, contracts of adhesion couldn't force people into arbitration in California, and class action waivers were generally held unenforceable. There are many cases all across the United States today with varying decisions on the enforceability of mandatory binding arbitration agreements. There is no doubt that mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts of adhesion is bad for most Americans. The only groups that like the idea of mandatory arbitration are big business and the chamber of commerce. Arbitration doesn't discourage consumer litigation; it eliminates it entirely. Who is going to arbitrate a $75 dispute with your phone company provider? And if your phone company is overcharging you $75, where does the consumer go? Or a $500 dispute? Or a $1,000 dispute? While a $75 rip off may not be the worst thing that happens to a consumer, it nevertheless is wrong and should be stopped. And a $75 dispute magnified over tens of thousands of customers means millions of dollars the corporation is stealing from its consumers. The state and federal governments have neither the ability nor the resources to litigate these cases on behalf of consumers. So if class actions are eliminated for this category of cases, and the government won't enforce the laws, it is a license to steal from America.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

The Importance of Judicial Diversity

By Professor Laurie Levenson and Courtnee Draper '14

This op-ed originally appeared in the Friday, Feb. 15, 2013 edition of the Los Angeles and San Francisco Daily Journal.


As Thomas Jefferson proclaimed, "The most sacred of the duties of a government is to do equal and impartial justice to all its citizens." To accomplish this goal, it is imperative that we have a diversified bench. Recent national studies show that minority groups lag far behind in their confidence in our judicial system. While 62 percent of white voters view the courts as fair and impartial, only 55 percent of non-whites feel the same. In fact, 85 percent of some minority groups believe there are two systems of justice: one for the rich and powerful, and one for everyone else.

Overall, judges of color account for just 12 percent of all state court judges chosen since 2000. In California, we have a long way to go until our bench reflects the population that it serves. For example, Asians comprise 15 percent of the state's population; however, they represent only 5 percent of all judges. A more concerted effort has been made to appoint African-Americans to the California bench. African-Americans constitute 6 percent of the state population, and they too represent only 5 percent of the current judges.

The greatest focus has been on the appointment of Latino judges. Since January 2011, 15 new Latino judges have been appointed to the bench, increasing the representation of Latino judges to 8.2 percent. Yet in a state where 37.6 percent of the population is Latino, there is still a long way to go before the bench is diverse enough that Latinos are anything other than "token" appointees.
We also need to focus on other underrepresented groups in judicial appointments. For example, there is still a significant gender gap in our state's judicial appointments. Women comprise almost 40 percent of California's lawyers. However, they still represent only 33 percent of the judicial appointments. Of course, women of color face the double challenge of being both a woman and a minority when a seeking judicial appointment.

Nor do the challenges for minorities and women end once they are appointed to the bench. Sometimes, they are more vulnerable to challenge in retention elections, particularly if they have foreign-sounding names. While the public might like to think that in 2013 there is no longer racial or gender bias, the statistics suggest otherwise. It is still tougher for certain groups to attain leadership positions, including seats on the bench, because of factors completely unrelated to their qualifications to be a judge.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Visiting Prof. Hughes Contributing to Prawsblawg Series

This semester, Loyola is delighted to be hosting Professor Justin Hughes, who is visiting from Cardozo School of Law. Professor Hughes is currently participating in an online forum on Robert Merges' book, Justifying Intellectual Property. You can find his first post here.