Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California

By Associate Clinical Professor Jessica Levinson

When people pose questions like, "Do you want to save our democracy? Our environment? Our schools?" I either answer "no" or keep walking. It is signature gathering time in California, and most of us have experienced that awkward moment when we are approached by an energetic, and often aggressive, petition gatherer. Inevitably the signature gatherer poses the type of question that would seem unimaginable to answer in the negative. And yet, I do, if I respond at all. Why?

The more I think about and study the initiative process, the more I feel committed to the idea that I will not sign petitions for ballot measures. I say this with full awareness of the fact that I am and have been a strong proponent of the independent redistricting commission, which was created by a ballot initiative. I have struggled with the idea that perhaps initiatives should only affect governmental processes such as redistricting, term limits and campaign finance laws. The problem with that approach has played out thanks to our term limit law.

So do not get me wrong, I think at least a portion of these proposed ballot initiatives would support worthwhile ideas or causes, I just do not think they should be made into the law through the initiative process. (The problem, of course, is that some of these ideas may never be enacted via the legislative process as this is a representative democracy, and frankly, that is what happens). In addition, many -- far too many -- of these proposed ballot initiatives sound like great ideas until one actually reads the text of the proposed law.

[Click here to continue reading Levinson's commentary on KCET.org]

Guest Speaker Maxwell L. Stearns on the State of Democracy

Maxwell L. Stearns, Marbury Research Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law spoke on "Direct (Anti-)Democracy" as part of Loyola's Faculty Workshop Series.

Happy Second Birthday, Citizens United: Now On To Your Terrible Twos

By Associate Clinical Professor Jessica Levinson

Dear Citizens United,

Happy birthday. I won't wish you many happy returns of the day. I both hope there aren't many more birthdays, and if there are, I trust they won't be happy ones, at least not for democracy.

But congratulations, you've made it, against all odds. You started as a relatively narrow little case, asking only whether a non-profit corporation could use general treasury funds to create and promote a hit piece against then-presidential candidate Hilary Clinton. You, Citizens United, merely asked the Supreme Court to find the now-vanishing McCain-Feingold law could not be validly applied to you.

But then a funny thing happened on the way to that narrow decision, the Supreme Court decided to ask its own question. The Court apparently was not particularly concerned with centuries of tradition which dictates that they resolve the questions asked by the parties, as opposed to asking themselves a question they wish to answer.

So the Supreme Court sent you back, and asked for more information on whether McCain-Feingold could validly be applied to any corporation. You'll forgive my lack of surprise when I discovered that the Court decided to answer its own question in the affirmative. As so many of us know by now, the Court ruled that for purposes of campaign finance restrictions corporations must be treated as identical to people. If a restriction cannot be placed on a person, then it cannot be applied to a corporation. The Court also held that expenditures -- no matter how large -- made independently of candidates have no potential for corrupting candidates. I'll pause here for laughter.

[Click here to continue reading Levinson's commentary on the Huffington Post.]

Maples v. Thomas: Putting the "Just" Back into Justice

By Professor Laurie Levenson

Last week, the United States Supreme Court decided Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. ___ (2012). Technically, the case was about whether Cory Maples, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, would be able to overcome a procedural hurdle in the federal habeas corpus laws and seek relief in federal court. The problem arose when Maples' pro bono lawyers from the prestigious law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell abandoned him, causing him to miss the deadline for appealing the denial of his state habeas corpus petition.

The Supreme Court unquestionably reached the right result when it ruled that there was cause for the procedural default and that Maples' lawyers' blunder should not undermine his ability to seek habeas relief. However, what was most interesting about the decision was not the technical legal analysis. It was the language Justice Ginsburg used to emphasize why the Court would be ruling the way it did.

She began her decision by stating that "no just system would lay the default at Maples' death-cell door...." (emphasis added). In other words, it is time to put the "just" back into "justice." The laws are full of procedural hurdles for defendants seeking to attack their convictions, but defendants should not bear the brunt of mistakes committed by their lawyers. This is especially true in a system where some states cap defense attorney fees at $1,000 for out-of-court work and these lawyers are paid only $70 per hour. Clients abandoned by counsel should not be left without recourse. The goal should be a "just "system. That system has costs and it is time to open our eyes to them.

While Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented, conservative Justice Samuel Alito concurred. He stated that this case presented the "perfect storm of misfortune" leading to the deprivation of Maples' legal representation. He may be right that this was the perfect storm, but the forecast for future cases does not look particularly sunny. Given the lack of qualified death penalty counsel and the absence of resources to pay them, there will inevitably be more storm clouds ahead.

Supreme Court limits First Amendment scrutiny of copyright laws in Golan v. Holder opinion

By Professor Jay Dougherty

On Jan. 18, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated decision in a case challenging the constitutionality of 17 U.S.C. §104A, which restored copyright to millions of foreign works and granted federal copyright to pre-1972 foreign sound recordings. As the Court did previously in Eldred v. Ashcroft, upholding the constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act that extended all existing copyrights for 20 years, it exhibited great deference to legislative decisions as to the extent of copyright, notwithstanding the constitutional language that appears to limit legislative power to grant copyrights in order to "promote the progress" of knowledge and only for limited times. The plaintiffs, orchestra leaders and others who had relied on the public domain status of various foreign works argued that, unlike the CTEA, the restoration statute removed works from the public domain. The Court rejected their arguments. According to the majority, Congress can accord copyright protection in circumstances that do not elicit the production of new works of authorship--it is the system of protection generally that must promote progress. The government argued here that it benefits U.S. authors for the U.S. to more rigorously comply with its copyright treaty obligations, even if the new law did not elicit creation of new works (or accord any protection to U.S. works). Because the restored foreign copyrights would not last any longer than they would have, had they not entered the public domain in the first place, the statue did not violate the constitutional limited times restriction any more than the CTEA did.

Perhaps more significantly, the Court clarified the class of copyright legislation that would alter the traditional contours of copyright and thus be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Clearly, copyright laws "abridge speech," in a sense. In Eldred, the Court had rejected a First Amendment challenge except in cases where legislation alters the traditional contours of copyright. This was because copyright law contains its own internal protections of free speech interests, namely the exclusion of copyright protection for ideas and the fair use defense that permits the use of another's copyrighted expression in some situations, e.g. for purposes of commentary or parody. A panel of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals earlier in the development of this case had interpreted the USSC's language such that a law that removed works from the public domain would also alter the traditional contours of copyright. After all, the traditional contour of copyright protection is that works receive protection until they enter the public domain, but can thereafter be freely used by anyone. In the new decision, the Court clarified that only legislation that impacted the denial of copyright for ideas or limited fair use would alter traditional contours and require stricter First Amendment scrutiny.

[Read a longer piece of commentary on the history of the case and the oral argument before the Supreme Court last fall.]

Justices Breyer and Alito dissented. Essentially, they argued that copyright laws must be justified by a utilitarian rationale as they have historically. Also that they elicit creation of new works for the ultimate benefit of society. Removing existing works from the public domain does not elicit any new creation, and also impacts free speech interests of the public. Hence, they argued, such a law should be scrutinized to see that it served some important copyright-related purpose. Even if solidifying the U.S. position in the international copyright system is important, the treaties actually permit less restrictive alternatives than the approach chosen by the legislature. Encouraging dissemination of works (rather than creation of new works), which the majority argued would promote knowledge, could be argued to authorize Congress to remove the Bible from the public domain, according to the dissenters. They concluded that the restoration statute exceeded Congress' power under the Constitution.

Professor Charlotte Goldberg files amicus brief in high-profile marital property case

By Professor Charlotte Goldberg

An aging music legend, Frankie Valli, suffers from heart problems. He decides to buy a $3.75 million life insurance policy so his wife and three children will be taken care of in case of his death. To avoid probate, he names his wife Randy as "owner" of the policy. The premiums on the policy are paid from community property funds. Instead of Frankie dying, Frankie and Randy divorce. At the time of their trial, the life insurance policy has a cash value of $365,000. The major legal question in the case is whether the policy is community property because it was purchased with community funds or whether the policy is wife Randy's separate property because the policy is in her name. If the policy is community property, each spouse owns one-half. If the policy is wife Randy's separate property, it belongs to her exclusively.

The trial court in the case determined that the policy was community property. The Court of Appeal reversed and found the policy was wife Randy's separate property. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the case, which has generated interest in both academia and in the Bar. The case represents a classic clash between community property concepts and common law title doctrine.

Under community property law, the conventional wisdom regarding property titled in one spouse's name is that it is presumed to be community property under Family Code §760. The spouse claiming it is separate property must rebut by tracing to separate property funds or by proving a transmutation. Here wife Randy cannot do that because it was agreed that community property funds were used to purchase the policy. However, under California Evidence Code §662, if the title indicates ownership, then Frankie would have to show otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that Evidence Code §662 controlled rather than Family Code §760's community property presumption. Also, the Court of Appeal stated that the Family Code §852 requirements for transmutation did not apply because the policy was purchased from a third party and was not an interspousal transaction.

Four amicus briefs, from law professors and family law attorneys, were filed in support of Frankie Valli's arguments that the community property presumption and the Family Code transmutation requirements apply in this case. [Read the amicus brief filed by Professor Goldberg and Professor Herma Hill Kay (Berkeley).] Their arguments are that historically and philosophically community property concepts embodied in the Family Code should control not common law title as prescribed by Evidence Code §662. The Supreme Court is also called on to resolve whether the transmutation requirements apply to this transaction even though it is a purchase from a third party.

The Supreme Court decision will determine whether community property concepts will triumph over common law.

Professors Petherbridge and Rantanen argue that the America Invents Act could be counterproductive

By Professors Lee Petherbridge & David Schwartz

Professor Lee Petherbridge is involved in a debate on PENNumbra, a University of Pennsylvania Law School project (originating with their law review) that hosts debates between scholars on current controversies. He and Professor Jason Rantanen of the University of Iowa College of Law have asserted that despite its stated goal to stimulate innovation and job creation, the America Invents Act (recent patent reform legislation) may well do just the opposite. In response, Professor Kesan (Illinois) examines other sections of the Act, arguing that they provide more reason to be optimistic.
In the piece, the professors argue that:

"All rules are distortive. In perhaps no instance is this idea more true than when it comes to the patent system. In a very fundamental sense, the system is nothing more than a set of rules imposed for the very purpose of affecting the behavior of economic actors. Like so many other rules, it has a laudable purpose: the desire to efficiently stimulate invention and innovation.

The purpose of the newly enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) is to rearrange the rules of the patent system and thus to create a new and different set of benefit and cost possibilities for economic actors. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). Unfortunately, the changes in benefits and costs worked by the AIA seem tailored to do two things: (1) discourage the patent-driven incentive to innovate, and (2) protect market power. This suggests the AIA may have a negative effect on American competitiveness and job creation, a disappointing outcome given that Congress's express purpose in enacting the law is to promote technological development and protect the rights of small businesses and inventors."

Read the complete debate on PENNumbra.