Reflections on Epic Systems v. Lewis

By Professor Hiro Aragaki

Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three consolidated cases, styled Epic Systems Corp. v Lewis, Nos. 16–285, 16–300, 16–307, 584 U.S. __ (2018), that all raised the issue of whether a class arbitration wavier in various employment contracts was enforceable, given the potentially conflicting mandates of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  In a 5-4 majority opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that there was no conflict between the two federal statutes and that both were consistent with enforcing the class arbitration wavier.  Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, also found no conflict but believed that both statutes were consistent with the opposite conclusion—namely, that the class arbitration wavier was illegal and should not be enforced.  In the alternative, the dissent reasoned that even if there were a conflict, the waiver was still unenforceable. 

The basic facts of these consolidated cases were that certain employees sought to bring a putative class action against their employers even though their employment contract contained a class arbitration waiver—that is, a clause that not only requires the employee to arbitrate rather than sue in court, but that also prohibits the employee from bringing a class arbitration on behalf of similarly situated employees.  The employees argued that the waiver was illegal and thus unenforceable, because NLRA section 7 had been construed by the National Labor Relations Board to give employees an absolute, non-waivable right to band together in a class when suing their employers.  See D. R. Horton, 357 N. L. R. B. 2277 (2012).  The employers countered that under the FAA section 2, class arbitration waivers must be enforced strictly according to their terms, in some cases even if those terms are otherwise illegal. 

These cases therefore raised the specter of a conflict between two federal statutes: The NLRA, enacted in 1935, and the FAA, enacted in 1925.  Under traditional conflict of laws principles, in the event of an unavoidable conflict between coequal statutes the later-enacted statute controls (in this case, the NLRA).  In Epic Systems, that would translate into a victory for the employee.  So the employers had to hang their hat on the argument that there was no inherent conflict between the FAA and the NLRA. 

Finding a Bright Line on Expression in Masterpiece Cake Case

Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon is following the U.S. Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The case stems from baker Jack Phillips’ refusal to make a wedding cake for a safe-sex couple, which challenged the refusal based on the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.

Professor West-Faulcon, Loyola’s James P. Bradley Chair in Constitutional Law, observes:

This is a case that tries to pit our constitutional right to be free from government censorship of our expression against civil rights protections for same-sex couples. I think finding a sensible place to draw the line on what constitutes artistic expression would mean people who run store-front bakeries must serve all of their products to all of the public because a bakeshop is a public accommodation. If you are more “artist” than baker, I’d think the Court would expect you to have a private studio with more exclusivity than a place where the general public goes to buy cookies.

Loyola Professors Commenting on SCOTUS News

Loyola Law School, Los Angeles professors are commenting on the news arising out of the U.S. Supreme Court today:

GRANT OF CERT

Gill v. Whitford (Wisconsin gerrymandering case)

• Professor Jessica Levinson: Levinson teaches Money, Politics & the Supreme Court and serves as president of the Los Angeles Ethics Commission. 
• Professor Justin Levitt: Levitt is a national renowned scholar on redistricting who runs the website, All About Redistricting. 

OPINIONS

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County (civil procedure/personal jurisdiction)

• Professor Adam Zimmerman: “In terms of impact, I think this case is kind of the sleeper case of the term,” says the complex litigation expert and Gerald Rosen Fellow. “It's going to impact thousands of cases in state MDLs, class actions and, I think, federal MDL litigation (which comprises nearly 40% of all cases in our federal courts.)” Zimmerman’s immediate reaction to the opinion is available online via @Adam_Zimmerman. 
• Professors Allan Ides & Simona Grossi: The civil procedure experts filed an amicus brief in the case (below). 

Matal v. Tam (The Slants case; disparagement clause in trademark approval/First Amendment)

• Professor Justin Levitt: This case decides that the Federal Trademark Office can't refuse to register a trademark that may ‘disparage’ or ‘bring ... into contemp[t] or disrepute’ individuals or groups,” writes the constitutional law expert. “The case follows a line of recent cases looking very skeptically at government laws or policies that burden speech -- and an even longer line of recent cases looking even more skeptically at government laws or policies that treat some private speech worse than others based on its content or viewpoint. The Court divided 4-4 on the precise legal framework, but all 8 Justices hearing the case (Justice Gorsuch wasn't yet on the Court when this was heard) agreed that the statute prohibiting registration of disparaging marks was out of bounds, and that the question wasn't particularly close. This impacts not only The Slants (which will be able to get their name trademarked), but also some other prominent and very controversial brands, like the Washington Redskins, whose trademark had been canceled as ‘disparaging’ in June 2014.” 
• Professor Jennifer Rothman: “The decision is no surprise. The 8-0 decision -- that Gorsuch did not participate in -- holds that the bar to registering trademarks that are deemed ‘disparaging’ or offensive is struck down. This means that The Slants can register their mark for their band, even if some view it as disparaging or insulting to Asian people, and it also means that the Washington Redskins marks which were cancelled for the same reason will be reinstated. The decision also likely eliminates the bar on registering marks that are scandalous or immoral."

Gorsuch Should Look Forward, Not Behind

By Professor Allan Ides

This op-ed originally appeared in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

Judge Neil Gorsuch, President Donald J. Trump’s nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court, has described his method of constitutional interpretation as one in which he tries “to apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be — not to decide cases based on their own moral convictions or the policy consequences they believe might serve society best.” As such, Gorsuch’s constitutional philosophy is akin to the originalism endorsed by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. It pegs our future on the past and it draws a bright line between those judges who adhere to the law — originalists — and those who impose their will on it — presumably everyone else.

On its surface, original understanding may seem to offer an attractive and principled approach to judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Under that approach, the judge operates as a neutral umpire who enforces the values established in 1789 or those found in subsequent constitutional amendments. It offers the hope of constitutional stability and leaves to democracy the responsibility of adjusting the Constitution to modern realities. But this vision is belied by the reality of how judges and justices actually interpret the law and resolve disputes. It is also premised on a highly unrealistic impression of how the American democracy works.

Virtually all judges are originalists when it comes to an unambiguous constitutional text. No sensible judge would struggle with the meaning of Article II’s requirement that limits the presidential office to a person who has “attained to the age of 35 years.” But most of the contested provisions of the Constitution are stated in open-textured, sweeping terms. Some obvious examples include “the free exercise” of religion, “the freedom of speech, or of the press,” and the guarantees of “due process.” Those phrases may sound relatively definite, but they aren’t. Even originalists disagree among themselves over their respective meanings. Other open-textured phrases define the powers of Congress, the presidency, and the judiciary; and still others limit the powers of the states with broadly worded terms such as “privileges or immunities” and “equal protection of the laws.” The question is whether originalism can provide a sustainable and sensible path to the correct understanding of such contestable provisions. I have my doubts.

Another Personal Jurisdiction Case in the Supreme Court

By Professor Simona Grossi

Some people have asked me to comment on the latest personal jurisdiction case pending in the U.S. Supreme Court. It did strike me that the Supreme Court has granted review in another personal jurisdiction case. As described by the Petitioner in BNSF Railway Company v. Tyrell, No. 16-405, the question presented is the following:

Whether a state court may decline to follow this Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, which held that the Due Process Clause forbids a state court from exercising general personal jurisdiction over a defendant that is not at home in the forum state, in a suit against an American defendant under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.

I would describe the question somewhat differently. I would say that the question is whether FELA authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction in state and federal courts in those states in which a railroad is “doing business,” and if so, whether Congress has the power to do so.

In relevant part, FELA provides that

An action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.

45 U.S.C. §56. Plaintiffs filed their FELA suit in a Montana state court. The defendant did not reside in Montana, nor did the injury-causing incident occur there. The defendant was, however, engaged in regular course of business in Montana. Thus, in filing their suit in Montana, the plaintiffs relied on the doing-business portion of §56.

Prof. Lazaroff Sees O'Bannon Decision as Casualty of Smaller Court

Today, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would not review the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA antitrust case. The decision lets stand a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that the NCAA is subject to antitrust scrutiny but that schools are not required to compensate student athletes with money “untethered to educational purposes.”

Professor Emeritus Dan Lazaroff, former director of the Sports Law Institute at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, is available for commentary. Of the decision, the antitrust expert says:

“This is not a surprising result, given the fact that other antitrust cases against the NCAA are pending in the Ninth and other federal circuits. Some of the ongoing litigation sweeps more broadly than O'Bannon, so it makes sense for the court to consider these issues down the road with a more complete picture of where the lower federal courts stand. The court likes to take up cases when there is a conflict in the circuits, so waiting increases the likelihood of that. Being down one justice might have been a factor. My sense is that any vote by the eight could easily break down 4 -4, and that would make for a big waste of everybody's time.”

Do Lawyers Make Better Presidents?

What do the following Presidents have in common: Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt? All are frequently voted by historians as amongst the 10best U.S. Presidents – and all were lawyers or law school graduates.

And what do the following Presidents have in common: Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, and Richard Nixon? All are frequently voted by historians as among the 10 worst U.S. Presidents – and all were lawyers or law school graduates.

Combined with the fact that many highly regarded presidents were not trained in law – including George Washington, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower – these lists suggest that legal training is not necessarily correlated with the good judgment, political acumen, and leadership skill necessary to excel in the Oval Office. But there’s more to the story than the best-and-worst rankings.

The most important number may be that 25 out of 44 presidents graduated from law school or practiced law. (The two are not the same thing, especially in earlier times when most lawyers entered the profession through apprenticeship.) Lawyers represent only 0.36% of the U.S. population, but over 56% of presidents. The electorate, it seems, considers legal training a useful characteristic in presidents – or least not a disqualifying one.

It stands to reason that legal credentials would be common among the people who excel at politics and public service. People with an interest in government tend to gravitate toward law, since most government posts involve law in one capacity or another, whether it be making it, interpreting it, or enforcing it. As a result, the pool of credible presidential candidates is more lawyer-heavy than the public at large. This helps explain why three out of four of this year’s presidential and vice-presidential candidates – Hillary Clinton, Tim Kaine, and Mike Pence – were practicing lawyers before running for public office. And why one former president – William Howard Taft – and one serious presidential candidate – Charles Evans Hughes – later became chief justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.

The modern J.D. degree builds knowledge and skills useful for office-holders even if they never represented clients. President Barack Obama, for example, never had a private practice comparable to that of First Lady Michelle Obama. But like President Bill Clinton before him, he taught constitutional law at a law school (where one eye could also be kept on political opportunities). For which of our past lawyer-presidents was the daily practice of law a major part of their personal and professional identity? President John Adams considered one of his greatest professional accomplishments to be his successful defense of some very unpopular criminal defendants: British soldiers charged in the Boston Massacre. President Abraham Lincoln was a self-taught lawyer renowned for his courtroom skills. His “country lawyer” persona remains a defining part of his legacy. Rounding out this list of presidents whose outlook on life may have been shaped by their legal practice is Richard Nixon, who practiced law both before entering Congress and during his mid-1960’s political hiatus. Nixon’s most well-remembered statement – “I am not a crook” – interacts poignantly with Lincoln’s advice to young lawyers: “Resolve to be honest at all events; and if in your own judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer.”

A law degree is of course no guarantee that today’s student will win tomorrow’s election. It does not guarantee how history will remember future lawyer-presidents. But as a credential that is both relevant for the job and respected by the voting public, a law degree seems to be a sound political investment.

In New Law Review Article, Prof. Guttentag Urges Supreme Court to Update Insider Trading Law

Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Professor Michael Guttentag’s newest law review article, “Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Tipper Wrongdoing in the 21st Century” discusses the first Supreme Court insider trading case in almost twenty years. In Salman v. United States, which is scheduled for oral argument on October 5th, the Supreme Court will consider when an insider’s tip to a friend or relative can trigger insider trading liability. Professor Guttentag, a securities law expert, provides background and context about what is at stake in this Supreme Court consideration of when tips can violate federal securities statutes. The article will be published in the Florida Law Review.

“I am hoping the Supreme Court will be bold enough to admit that the old rules about what counts as an illegal tip, developed in the era of the fax machine, are pretty much obsolete now,” said Guttentag, John T. Gurash Fellow in Corporate Law & Business. “In 2016, company policies and securities regulations strictly prohibit leaking confidential information. Insider trading law needs to reflect this new reality.”

Abstract:

The Supreme Court in deciding Salman v. United States should update a confused and increasingly obsolete aspect of insider trading doctrine: the rule that the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information can only trigger insider trading liability if “the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”

When it was introduced in Dirks v. SEC in 1983 this “personal benefit” test represented an imperfect effort to balance four competing rationales for determining when providing a tip should trigger insider trading liability. Two developments since Dirks was decided have made problems with this personal benefit test insurmountable. First, the SEC’s enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000 supplanted federal common law regulation of selective disclosures by public companies and, more pointedly, prohibited public companies from making precisely the types of selective disclosures to Wall Street analysts that the Dirks personal benefit test was designed to protect. Second, the adoption of the misappropriation theory of insider trading in United States v. O’Hagan greatly expanded the types of deceptive conduct that might lead to insider trading liability with important ramifications for how to identify tipper wrongdoing.

After Regulation FD and O’Hagan, the best approach going forward for identifying tipper wrongdoing would be to go back to the underlying statutory prohibition against deceptive conduct. Receipt of a personal benefit should be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for finding that a selective disclosure is sufficiently deceptive to trigger insider trading liability. Based on this updated standard, the Salman conviction should be upheld.

Supreme Court: With McDonnell Opinion, Ex-Governor Will Get Another Day in Court

By Professor Jessica Levinson

Today the Supreme Court unanimously tossed out the conviction of former Virginia Governor McDonnell. While Gov. McDonnell's behavior was offensive, it may not be criminal. Gov. McDonnell may still see the inside of a prison cell, but a jury will have to make that determination based on the Court's interpretation of the federal bribery laws.

The court found that "our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of the federal bribery statute."

Gov. McDonnell was convicted under a statute which required that individuals make an "official act." The Court narrowed the meaning of that law, finding that merely "[s]etting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event—without more—does not fit that definition of 'official act.'" Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that a broader interpretation of the term "official act" would create constitutional problems. It would also criminalize politics as usual.

Garland on the Rights of People with Disabilities

By Dean Michael Waterstone

This op-ed originally appeared in the April 28, 2016 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

What would Justice Merrick Garland mean for the U.S. Supreme Court? Despite signals that recalcitrant Republicans want to avoid this discussion, I hope lots of different groups begin to have a public dialogue about this important question. I teach, research and write in the area of disability law, a subset of civil rights law. Laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act have helped people with disabilities attain full citizenship in our country, yet there is still a long way to go.

Cases involving the civil rights claims about people with disabilities raise important questions involving individual rights, business' ability to comply with regulations in a cost-effective manner and state power. There are no easy answers. Yet one important thing about disability law is that it has tended to transcend typical left-right and Democrat-Republican divisions. Even in an era of extreme polarization, laws protecting the civil rights of people with disabilities have still been passed. There are lots of open legal questions within disability law, but ones on which there are potential political and judicial consensus. This makes the choice of the next Supreme Court justice an important one, and one about which lots of people should care. Disability is a growing category - it is the one minority group we could all join at any time.

Judge Garland does not himself have an obvious disability or life experience with disability that is yet part of the public record. So the cases he has decided offer the best road map for what his decision-making in this area might look like. Garland has written hundreds of opinions and participated in thousands of cases - here, I only have space to talk about a few, focusing on opinions or dissents Garland wrote himself.

If You're Going to Be a Single-Issue Voter, Make That Issue the Supreme Court

By: Professor Jessica Levinson
This is an excerpt from an op-ed Professor Levinson wrote for Pacific Standard

Justice Antonin Scalia's unexpected death has thrown the importance of the Supreme Court into focus. Amid all the partisan bickering and obstructionist, political posturing we should take a moment to talk about why the composition of the United States' highest-ranking court matters. Simply put, the people who sit in its nine chairs can have lasting power far beyond the man (or perhaps, someday, woman) who appoints them.

First, while presidents can hold office for a maximum for eight years, Supreme Court justices (along with all lower federal judges) hold lifetime appointments. Justices can—and often do—stay in office for decades.

Read the full article here.

A Deeper Introspection of Police Behavior: Treatment of People with Disabilities

By Professor Michael Waterstone

This op-ed originally appeared in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

A police encounter with an individual goes horribly wrong and leads to great bodily harm or even death of that individual. Some argue that even though there were tragic consequences, the police action was regrettably justified. Others view this awful occurrence as providing direct evidence that the police acted inexcusably and perhaps even criminally, at some level not respecting the fundamental humanity of the individual. It reflects still-existing power imbalances and institutionalized racism in our society.

This narrative fits Michael Brown and Ferguson. Or Eric Garner. And indeed both of these cases stimulated a national and painful conversation about police and their encounters with citizens. Those who confront these issues on an all-too-often basis express their frustration, leading to protests and even violence. People who may not think often about racial justice are drawn in and forced to think about uncomfortable issues. Either way, hard questions about police training and their role in society are teed up. Everyone has an opinion.

But this first paragraph applies equally to another fact pattern that occurs all to regularly, yet one that most people do not think about or realize. It reflects the case of Teresa Sheehan, currently before the Supreme Court (City and County of San Francisco v. Teresa Sheehan). The following facts are drawn from the briefs in the case.

Dean Gold Op-ed Explores High Court Ruling on Juror Testimony

By Dean Victor Gold

This op-ed originally appeared in the Dec. 16, 2014 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled last week that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) makes inadmissible a juror’s testimony that another member of the jury lied during voir dire when that testimony is offered to support a motion for a new trial.

Warger v. Shauers was a negligence action brought in federal district court to recover for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident. During voir dire, the plaintiff’s counsel asked prospective jurors if there was any reason they would be unable to be fair and impartial. The prospective juror, who later became jury foreperson, answered no. The jury eventually returned a defense verdict.

The plaintiff’s subsequent motion for a new trial asserted that the jury foreperson lied during voir dire. In support of that motion, the plaintiff submitted a juror’s affidavit that, during deliberations, the jury foreperson stated that her daughter once had been at fault in an auto accident and that, had she been sued, her life would have been ruined. Denying the motion, the district court held that the affidavit was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which provides that “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,” evidence “about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations” is inadmissible, subject to limited exceptions. The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The origins of Rule 606(b) can be traced to the 18th century and a version of the rule is in place in virtually every state. The rule is venerable and universal because the policy behind it is so basic: Protecting the privacy of jury deliberations is essential both to encouraging full and open debate in the jury room and preventing harassment of jurors after a verdict. Without such a rule, no verdict would be final because the jury’s deliberations and thinking would be open to scrutiny. And because jurors are laypersons charged with the difficult task of applying often complex law to conflicting versions of facts, it would be a rare case where that scrutiny did not uncover misstep of logic or law.

The facts in Warger present a good example of the mischief that might ensue without a law like Rule 606(b). As in Warger, virtually every potential juror in virtually every case is asked the generic question, “Is there any reason why you might be unable to be fair and impartial in this case?” Typically, only those who answer “no” are selected to serve on the jury. But every trial lawyer takes that answer with a grain of salt. Every juror has biases. In fact, lawyers strive during jury selection to impanel jurors who are favorably biased. Few verdicts would survive if statements made during deliberations were admissible to support a motion for new trial on the ground jurors lied during voir dire in response to the generic question about being fair and impartial.

Affirmative Action and Binders Full of Women

By Associate Professor Aaron Caplan

Every year, my constitutional law students study Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979), which involved a Massachusetts program giving veterans an employment preference when applying for state jobs. Since at that time veterans were overwhelmingly male, the law effectively locked females out of state jobs. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the program, explaining that the state would not be discriminating by enacting a law that disproportionately harmed women -- unless the state chose that law "because of," and not merely "in spite of" its disparate impact.

I do not know whether Massachusetts still has a veterans preference, but according to presidential candidate Mitt Romney, he did his part to find state employment for women while he was governor of that state. As he told the story during the Oct. 16 debate:
As I was serving as governor of my state ... I had the chance to pull together a cabinet and all the applicants seemed to be men.

And I went to my staff, and I said, “How come all the people for these jobs are all men?” They said, “Well, these are the people that have the qualifications.” And I said, “Well, gosh, can’t we find some women that are also qualified?”

And we took a concerted effort to go out and find women who had backgrounds that could be qualified to become members of our cabinet.

I went to a number of women’s groups and said, “Can you help us find folks,” and they brought us whole binders full of women.

Marriage equality's road to the Court

By Associate Professor Doug NeJaime

This is the third installment in the 11-part series, "11 on '11," in which Loyola Law School professors are weighing in on what they expect to be the biggest legal issues in their fields in 2011. (On Monday, Dec. 6, Professor NeJaime will live Tweet the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals oral arguments in Perry v. Schwarzenegger beginning at 10 a.m. PT. He will provide follow-up analysis on Summary Judgments afterward.)

Everyone now seems to agree: The U.S. Supreme Court will eventually take up the issue of marriage for same-sex couples. But an open question remains: in what context?

Two potentially landmark federal cases are working their way through the courts. The first, Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, is a carefully constructed piece of movement advocacy. LGBT rights lawyers have long avoided the issue of marriage in the federal courts, preferring instead to work with sympathetic state courts (and, increasingly, legislatures) and keep the issue away from a generally conservative U.S. Supreme Court. But after a series of state-level victories, lawyers at Boston-based Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed their Gill complaint, which challenges the unequal treatment of Massachusetts married couples (same-sex vs. different-sex) under the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). DOMA prohibits the federal government from recognizing same-sex "spouses," thereby creating two separate systems of federal treatment of couples who are married for Massachusetts state law purposes.

Meanwhile, in the wake of Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to prohibit marriage for same-sex couples, the newly formed American Foundation for Equality Rights (AFER) filed Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a federal constitutional challenge to the ban. While LGBT rights lawyers refused to challenge Proposition 8 in federal court and discouraged AFER from doing so--preferring instead to work at the state level--famed litigators Ted Olson and David Boies took the case.

Supreme Court takes on violence in videogames

By Professor F. Jay Dougherty

The Supreme Court heard oral argument today in the case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n. This case is a facial challenge to California's recent attempt to regulate minors' access to certain "violent videogames". In U.S. law, certain sexual material--obscenity--is excluded from other "speech" protected from government regulation by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has, however, permitted laws that limit a minor's access to certain sexual material that would not be "obscene" as to an adult, and that don't unduly restrict an adult's access to such material. But historically, violent material has been viewed as fully protected speech, and "obscenity" has been carefully limited to sexual material. The rare instances where violent speech can be unlawful involve speech that is intended to and likely to cause imminent unlawful behavior. That rationale is not the core justification for the California statute in this case. Rather, the argument is that violent material will cause psychological harm to minors. Hence, in this case, California asked the Court to treat violence for the first time much like obscenity--permit states to limit minors' access to material, even if that material would clearly be protected unregulable speech as to an adult.

The lower courts have refused to do that in this case (and in other cases challenging similar laws in other states). The Ninth Circuit refused to extend to violent videogames the rules applicable to obscenity regulation, and, applying the "strict scrutiny" required as to content-based regulations of speech (which the state law would be), found that scrutiny not satisfied. First, there was no credible evidence that violent media causes psychological harm to anyone, including children. Since protecting against such harm was the only "compelling government interest" the state could assert, the law failed strict scrutiny. Even if one assumed the state did prove such a compelling interest, the statute failed the second part of the strict scrutiny test; namely that the law be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate that interest and there are no less restrictive alternatives. The current industry rating system, the availability of parental controls on modern gaming systems, and enhancing education of parents and retailers about that system would achieve the goal in a less restrictive manner, according to the Ninth Circuit.